This article examines a unique, yet paradigmatic, case study of a colonial neighborhood in East Jerusalem that is undergoing a significant demographic transformation.
activists and the neighborhood council were drawn into a series of conflicts over spatial and political control, as noted in the opening quotation of this article. Ideological movements and political coalitions were established in reaction to Haredi or Palestinian presence on one hand, and to represent an anti-racist agenda on the other.
In this way, a Jewish neighborhood/settlement with a predominant secular majority, which was integral to the colonization project of East Jerusalem (Yacobi & Pullan, 2014) , became ethnically and religiously heterogeneous. This neighborhood intersects the two major conflicts of contemporary Israeli space: the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and the internal struggle between secular and ultra-Orthodox Jews. As such, we would argue, the FH neighborhood is one of the most paradigmatic sites of contemporary urban dynamics in Israel.
In this article, we present the findings from a questionnaire survey of 195 Israeli and Palestinian respondents, residents of FH. In addition, we have conducted 10 in-depth interviews with active residents from the neighborhood and an analysis of local news reporting, with the aim of describing the main ethnic/religious groups that reside in the neighborhood. This paper conceptualizes the ways in which class affiliations are relevant to the analysis of nationally contested spaces. Based on the case of the FH settlement/neighborhood in Jerusalem, we will demonstrate how ethno-national and class identities are entangled in the framing of new coalitions and territorial positionings in a context of spatial contestation. We aim to study the social order and power relation that has been constructed in FH, not only between the macro political categories of Israelis and Palestinians, but also among social sub-categories: Jerusalem Palestinians, Israeli Palestinians, secular Jews and Haredi Jews. By intersecting these political and social identities we suggest an analysis of the geopolitics of neighboring in a dual context; being part of the colonial project of Judaizing East Jerusalem on the one hand, and an ordinary habitat which embodies transitions of neighborhood succession and opposition, on the other.
We propose that the social category of class should be revisited and understood as a potential sphere of habitation that can challenge the ethno-national divide. Without overlooking the very colonial politics of Jerusalem, we claim that neoliberal restructuring of the Israeli economy has promoted the development of a new middleclass among the two deprived minorities of Israeli society: Palestinians and Haredi Jews. Both are driven by neoliberal ideals, namely a set of political economic practices proposing that human wellbeing can best be advanced by "the maximization of entrepreneurial freedoms within an institutional framework characterized by private property rights, individual liberty, unencumbered markets, and free trade" (Harvey, 2007, 22) . These two emerging sub-groups are drawn to mixed urban localities in which they can actualize their hybrid identities. Therefore, the main contribution of this article lies in the nexus between urban and political geography. This theoretical combination is built on the understanding that geopolitics is a useful analytical framework for studying the production of space, politics of fear and everyday life in cities (Yacobi, 2009; Rokem & Boano, 2017) , and that urban geopolitics is a necessary prism through which to study neo-liberalization, ethno-nationalism and international migration, when the majority of world population is urban (Rokem & Boano, 2017 , Luz & Stadler, 2017 . In the case of FH, the ongoing Israeli-Palestinian ethno-national conflict and the subsequent Israeli colonial control in Despite extensive discussions of cities and nationalism in general, there have been very limited attempts to engage seriously with the tensions and relations associated with the simultaneous effect of two major structural forces shaping contemporary cities, namely class and ethno-nationalism. It is beyond the scope of this article to discuss this matter in depth; however, we refer to the Marxist critique that focused on modernization, industrialization and class classifications as major actors, which influence urban dynamics and urbanization processes that produce and reproduce social stratification and wealth. This position characterized Marxist critique until the 1970s, when the identification of the forces operating in the urban space had changed. This shift points to other factors -in addition to class -that shape the social, political and cultural space of the capitalist city (Castells, 1978) . The significant stage in the development of this concept, also referred to as neo-Marxism, suggests that although class should be seen as an important element in understanding urban processes and conflicts, it must be understood as a component within a framework of other identities including gender, ethnicity and race (Castells, 1983, 291) . Even the recent seminal work on ethno-national contested cities (Bollens, 2018; Dumper, 2014; Pullan, 2011) has tended to favor issues of national control over the urban dynamics and everyday life in the city, concealed beneath the more visible national surface -a lacuna that this article aims to fill.
In this paper, we emphasize the relevance of urban geopolitical micro-analyses of the neighborhood's scale, by examining layers of neighborhood transitions, urban culturalreligious contestation (i.e. the Haredi/secular conflict) and the role of middle-class identity in residential spaces, we are advancing a more nuanced understanding of urban processes. Indeed, instead of focusing solely on top-down forces of division and exploitation, we suggest studying the city as "a contested space, as an arena of power relations where also 'bottom-up' protest, global forces and a wide spectrum of political institutions (NGOs, [non-governmental organizations], religious organizations, professionals) produce and reproduce urban space." (Yacobi 2015: 583) 
Israeli Urban Space and Neighborhood Transitions
Since the establishment of the State of Israel, the demographics of Israeli urban spaces have evolved in terms of the tension between ethno-national and economic transitions.
Between 1948 and the 1970s most of the Israeli housing market was centralized and regulated by the government. Key planning rationales were (and still are) determined by ethno-national policies of division and territorial control (Yiftachel, 1994) , aimed at reinforcing Jewish spatial domination. This top-down imposed and fostered segregation was created along multiple fault lines: ethno-national (Jews/Arabs), Jewish ethnic origin (European/Arabic/Russian/Ethiopian), Jewish religious-cultural identity (secular/Modern-Orthodox/Ultra-Orthodox), ideological (Kibbutz vs. Moshav) and socio-economic (social housing/private compounds) (Tzfadia and Yacobi, 2011) . Thus, until the 1970s, residential mobility and neighborhood demographic transitions were limited and marginal (Gonen, 1994) .
Significant trends of ethnic and national diversification in the neighborhoods became dominant once the national economy and urban culture entered the globalization era, and the housing market was privatized (Yacobi and Tzfadia, 2017) . Nationwide liquidation of agricultural lands, which began in 1991 and were followed by dramatic suburbanization processes, has led to the transformation of the Israeli urban humanscape. While upper-middle-class Jews moved to the new suburbs, other populations entered urban centers in Israel, among them Russian and Ethiopian Jewish immigrants, global labor migrants and African refugees. However, the two most significant groups, which are situated at the center of our discussion, that have profoundly challenged the predominant homogenous nature of middle-class Israeli neighborhoods are IsraeliPalestinians and Ultra-Orthodox Jews.
Palestinian Migration to Jewish Localities
Since 1948, Palestinian towns and villages in Israel have been economically deprived and spatially limited (Yiftachel, 1994; Falah, 1996) . New Jewish-Israeli towns, such as Carmiel and Upper Nazareth, were established on expropriated Palestinian land in order to strengthen Jewish domination in frontier territories (Hamdan, 2006) . Though outmigration from Palestinian to Jewish localities began as early as the 1960s, it has rapidly grown since the 1990s (ibid).
While Israeli-Palestinian intra-immigration to Jewish and mixed towns is diverse (Yacobi, 2009) , the more significant groups are students and nuclear families (MasryHerzallah & Razin, 2014) . These movements take place due to various push and pull factors: on one hand, shortage of land, insufficient housing and lack of job opportunities in Arab villages and towns (Al-Haj, 2012) ; on the other hand, relocation for purposes of higher education and search of a higher quality of life (Arar & Haj-Yehia, 2016) , as well as liberation from a confining traditional and gendered order (Herzog, 2007) .
When Israeli-Palestinians move further away from their hometowns, they may experience disconnection from their communities that may be translated to a loss of identity and belonging (Pullan & Yacobi, 2017) . Furthermore, there is evidence that in spite of the growing geographical proximity in the new locations, Israeli-Palestinians retain high social segregation from their Jewish neighbors (Goldhaber, 2007; BlatmanThomas, 2017) . The growing presence of Palestinians in Israeli Jewish and mixed cities has prompted negative reactions from local Jewish residents who fear the loss of domination and the decline in housing prices (Falah, 1996; Monterescu, 2016) . Thus, Palestinians in Jewish-Israeli towns face discrimination in housing (Pullan & Yacobi, 2017) , as well as local political opposition (Shafir, 2018) .
Israeli-Palestinians began to immigrate in considerable numbers to Jerusalem following the occupation of East Jerusalem in 1967. Primarily in order to study at the Hebrew University, some of them settled in the city and composed a solid layer of a middle class, professional and social group. Since they were fluent in both languages they were absorbed in the local labor market, as a "middle-man minority," mediating between the 
The Modern Haredi Middle Class
Since the beginning of the twentieth century, the Haredi population in Palestine has preferred to maintain territorial segregation of their dwelling spaces by maintaining clear boundaries from the outer, secular world. The spatial division serves as a means for facilitating the socialization of the younger generations into the Haredi society and for the prevention of their exposure and assimilation into the surrounding secular society and culture (Shilhav, 1993; Efron 2003) . Thus, for many years most of the Haredi population lived either in Haredi towns or in Haredi enclaves within cities. Yet, due to their ongoing demographic growth (Rebhun & Malach, 2012) , Haredi Jews are constantly expanding their residential territories by moving to new locations. This expansion, which takes form alongside a concurrent process of cultural and social introversion, fosters constant territorial struggles with local non-Haredi populations (Efron, 2003) .
In Jerusalem, Haredi Jews were always a dominant group among the general Jewish population. However, until the 1960s, they were concentrated northwest of the Old City (Shilhav, 1984) . The demographic growth led to spatial residential expansion to adjacent neighborhoods, to Haredi-designated neighborhoods, or to non-Haredi neighborhoods in which housing prices were affordable. In order to maintain the properties of a controlled space, codes of Haredi behavior were imposed on new territories (Gazit, 2010; Rosen & Shlay, 2014) . Thus, territorial struggles between the Haredi community of Jerusalem and secular or Modern-Orthodox communities have become one of the dominant features of West Jerusalem's local politics (Hasson, 2002) .
In the last decade, scholars have identified sub-current trends of class mobility and Israelization within Haredi society (Cahaner & Mansfeld, 2012; Zicherman & Cahaner, 2012) . The introduction of smartphones and exposure to the internet have undermined the imposed information closure on community members, alongside a growing tendency towards consumption culture. Economic demand for better employment has led to the formation of a new social layer of integrated modern Ultra-Orthodox. These modern Haredi groups prefer to live in mixed localities, on the edges of classic Haredi neighborhoods, where they alternate between Haredi facilities and non-Haredi services (Ibid). However, despite their modern character, their presence in non-Haredi residential urban spaces is still perceived by many secular residents as invasive and domineering (Shteinmatz, 2016) .
A Colonial-Neighborhood in Transition
Following the War of 1967, the Israeli government unilaterally annexed East Jerusalem, expanded the municipal boundaries and applied Israeli law to all of the city. These measures were taken despite international objection and lack of recognition. Beyond Israeli rhetoric representing Jerusalem as a unified city, the planning policies have contributed to the paradigm of a colonial city (Pullan & Yacobi, 2017) . Both the state and the city pursue these policies, which have persistently promoted the expansion of Jewish political, territorial, demographic and economic control to all parts of the city.
As already discussed (Yiftachel & Yacobi, 2002; Dumper, 2014; Shlomo, 2017) (H., personal interview, October 3, 2017). class (Zicherman & Cahaner, 2012) . They are attracted to the neighborhood not only because of the lower housing prices and good services, but also since principally they prefer to live in a mixed locality (Table 1) . Until recently, Haredi Jews did not receive designated educational services in FH. Only after a prolonged political campaign against the neighborhood city council and a mediation process did they managed to achieve in 2017 a legal status for two Haredi kindergartens (FHNC, January 31, 2017).
The profile of our Haredi respondents indicates that a high percentage (61%) are engaged in "secular" occupations, such as university students, high-tech engineers and lawyers. As quoted in the previous chapter, modern Haredi Jews are drawn to neighborhoods with diverse populations, which allow them to alternate between both worlds. E., a Haredi resident, suggests that these preferences are related to notions of individualism and a search for privacy:
We (E. E., personal interview, September 25, 2017).
Albeit major differences in their ethno-nationality and political position in Israel, as shown in Table 1 , the search for a residential space with good "quality of life" was a major drive for both Haredi Jews and Israeli-Palestinians to settle in the neighborhood.
Other influential factors are related to the neighborhood's location, its housing prices and diversity. It seems that the sociological context of the immigration of both groups to FH, relates to modern ambitions for freedom from traditional community boundaries.
However, as we will show in the following section, the Haredi presence in FH fosters greater resentment and active political rejection by the Jewish secular group. Jews reported minimal social connections and expressed negative reactions to intergroup encounters with both Haredi Jews and Muslim Arabs, however, the extent of social segregation and negative reactions was slightly greater towards the former group than towards the latter (Tables 2 and 3 Jewish residents of FH see the village as a source of political violence, criminal activities and sexual harassments, which is "invading" the neighborhood (Malcov, 2010) . We suggest that the underlying logic of this process is defined by the social transitions of the neoliberal era, in which "individual freedom is redefined as the capacity of selfrealization [..] with human behavior reconceptualised along economic lines" (Leitner et al., 2007, 4) . However, our study shows that while neoliberalism reconfigures spatial segregation and the ethnic division of social classes, it does not undermine the overall ethno-national hierarchies of Israeli society.
Fearing Diversity

Conclusions
In this article we proposed an urban geopolitical analysis of FH -a The study of ethnic conflicts tends to focus on state borders and national territories, ignoring the relevance of such analyses to the urban realm. In this context, some researchers (Newman, 2006) propose that the impact of borders and territoriality is not diminishing; rather, new scales of territorial affiliations and borders are recognizable, which may be flexible but are still selective on a different geographical scale. Indeed, we can conclude that it is necessary to focus on the geopolitics of neighboring in the study of cities. Furthermore, urban geopolitics differ from discussions of international relations and conflicts, or of the roles of military acts and wars in producing space.
Rather, urban geopolitics refers to the emergence of discourses and forces connected with technologies of control, patterns of internal migrations by individuals and communities, and the flow of cultures and capital (Yacobi, 2009; Fregonese, 2012; Rokem & Boano, 2017) .
The urban geopolitics of FH shows the relevance of class, as a dominant neighboring inter-ethnic identity, for the highly politicized geographies of the colonial neighborhoods of Jerusalem. We argue that further study of ethno-nationalist cities should relate to socio-economic class affiliations of people, groups and spaces as crucial factors in the analysis of urban domination and colonialism. Throughout history, cities have functioned as socio-political arenas where different classes, ethnic groups, migrants and "strangers" interacted (Bauman, 2013) . Indeed, situations in which "strangers become neighbors" (Sandercock, 2000) are highly political and involve protests, violence and sometimes acceptance -these experiences have become embedded within urban life.
